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THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE GOVERN-
MENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN ITS
INTERNATIONAL ASPECT
In his very interesting book on the United States in the Twen-
tieth Century, M. Leroy-Beaulieu uses the following remarkable
language :'
The first century following the annexation of Louisiana witnessed the
United States obtain a preponderating influence over North America. The
centenary of that great event finds the United States expanding beyond the
confines of America. Before the second centenary be far advanced the
United States will unquestionably dominate economically all the Asiatic and
American countries bordering on the Pacific, and will be playing in the
world the part played until these latter days by England.
This prediction is certainly gratifying to American pride. If it
is ever to be realized, its fulfilment must rest upon the basis of
national power and national good faith. The United States must
realize that it is a nation, that it has the power of a nation,
and is subject to the responsibilities of this power. Yet, surprising
as it may seem, the fact is undoubted that within a few years, and,
indeed, from time to time throughout our national existence, citizens
of the United States and of foreign countries as well, who had at
least for a time the public ear, have maintained that there was no
sanction to a treaty made by the United States, and no national
power capable of enforcing its provisions within the Federal limits.
The question was raised most recently in reference to the admission
of Japanese children to the public schools of San Francisco. It
has, however, been discussed in every decade since the Republic
came into being. Never did it have more importance than at the
present moment. My object in this paper is to maintain that a treaty,
when made by the President of the United States and ratified by the
Senate, is binding upon every resident of the United States and every
citizen of the Republic wherever he may be, and that the President
and the Federal Courts are vested with power to enforce the pro-
visions of the treaty, and that it is the duty of Congress to pass all
laws which may be necessary to carry these provisions into effect.
Since this is an International Association, it surely cannot be out
of place to call attention to the historic character of the American
x. Introduction, p. xxvi.
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Constitution. The War of the American Revolution, as Lord Bea-
consfield long ago pointed out, was not a war for freedom but for
independence. The rights which the English colonists brought with
them from Great Britain they retained. A strong spirit of personal
freedom was developed by the conditions of life in the New World,
and led finally to an impatience of restraint from the British Parlia-
ment. The war came, and at its close the British Government
recognized the independence of the thirteen colonies. These had
prosecuted the war under a confederacy which possessed few
national powers. The treaty of peace concluded at Paris, September
3rd, 1783, contained in its first article the following clause:
His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz., New
Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.
As soon as the cohesive power which the necessities of war had
exercised ceased to exist, the colonies began to realize that some-
thing more substantial was necessary to enable them to exist as a
nation. A convention was called.. A Constitution was adopted and
submitted to the States for ratification. The preamble of this instru-
ment declares that "We the people of the United States, in order
to form a more perfect union . . . do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America." To use the lan-
guage of our greatest constitutional lawyer, Daniel Webster -
The Constitution itself declares that it is ordained and established by
the people of the United States. . . . It is in this their collective capacity,
it is as all the people of the United States, that they establish the Constitu-
tion?
One of the distinctive features of this new government as com-
pared with the old confederacy was that it vested the executive
power in the President, the judicial power in one Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts "as Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish," and certain legislative powers, which are
specified, in a Congress. In the article relating to the executive
power it is provided that the President "shall have power, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, pro-
vided two-thirds of the Senate as present concur." (Article 2, Sec-
tion 2.)
In the article relating to the powers of Congress, certain restric-
tions upon the powers of the States are contained. Section 1o pro-
vides: "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confedera-
2. Webster's Works, vol. iii, p. 346.
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tion." It is evident from this statement, and certainly words could
not be plainer, that the controversy that has often arisen in the
United States as to whether particular powers are conferred upon
the general government or reserved to the States respectively does
not exist in reference to the treaty-making power. This is expressly
conferred in positive terms upon the Executive of the United States,
and is expressly denied, in words equally positive, to the several
States. The framers of the Constitution evidently intended that on
this point at least there should be no possible controversy. Accord-
ingly, in the sixth article, we find the following provision, subdi-
vision 2 -
This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made or which shall be made
under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
The effect of these provisions has never been better stated than
by our present Secretary of State, Mr. Root, in his address as Pres-
ident of the American Society of International Law at the first meet-
ing of that body in April last :_-
Legislative power is distributed; upon some subjects the national legis-
lature has authority; upon other subjects the State legislature has authority.
Judicial power is distributed; in some cases the Federal Courts have juris-
diction. In other cases the State Courts have jurisdiction. Executive power
is distributed; in some fields the national executive is to act; in other fields
the State executive is to act. The treaty-making power is not distributed;
it is all vested in the National Government; no part of it is vested in or
reserved to the States. In international affairs there are no States; there
is but one nation, acting in direct relation to and representative of every
citizen in every State. Every treaty made under the authority of the United
States is made by the National Government as the direct and sole represen-
tative of every citizen of the United States residing in California equally
with every citizen of the United States residing elsewhere. It is, of course,
conceivable that, under pretence of exercising the treaty-making power, the
President and Senate might attempt to make provisions regarding matters
which are not proper subjects of international agreement, and which would be
only colorable-not a real-exercise of the treaty-making power; but so far
as the real exercise of the power goes there can be no question of State
rights, because the Constitution itself, in the most explicit terms, has pre-
cluded the existence of any such question.
Another distinctive feature of the Government which has been
established by the American Constitution is the power conferred by
it upon courts of justice to declare with authority that a legislative
act is void because in violation of some provision of the organic law.
3. American Journal of International Law, vol. i, p. 278.
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The courts of America on the whole have exercised this great power
with moderation. But they have continuously exercised it from the
foundation of the Government. The language that has been already
quoted would seem to be clear. The practice under it has never
been better stated than by Mr. Webster himself :k-_-
The judicial power under the Constitution of the United Sfates was
made co-extensive with the legislative power. It was extended to all cases
arising under the Constitution and the laws of Congress. The Judiciary
became thus possessed of the authority of deciding in the last resort, in all
cases of alleged interference between State laws and the Constitution and
laws of Congress. Gentlemen, this is the actual Constitution, this is the law
of the land.
When therefore anyone seeks to understand the exact cliaracter
of the American Constitution it is necessary that he should study,
not only the text of that instrument, but the decisions of the courts
which have expounded it. Mr. Webster's lasting title to the grati-
tude of his countrymen is that he had the genius to perceive the
principles of construction upon which alone a written Constitution
could become a workable instrument. He had also the power of
forensic argument which enabled him to state these principles with
such clearness and such convincing force that the judges of the
Supreme Court, and notably Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, adopted
them and embodied them in the leading cases to which the student
of American Constitutional Law must always resort.
On the subject of the force and effect of treaties this great tribu-
nal has spoken with no uncertain sound. In the case of Ware v.
Hylton, decided in I796,5 it had under consideration a controversy
which had arisen in Virginia. A law of that State, passed at the
time of the Revolution, had confiscated debts which were due from
citizens of Virginia to British subjects. The treaty of peace which
was adopted in 1783 contained an agreement that creditors on either
side "shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the
full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore con-
tracted." A British subject brought an action in the Federal Court
for the district of Virginia to recover a debt from a citizen of
Virginia. The Supreme Court held that the treaty of 1783 had, as
it were, repealed this statute of Virginia and deprived it of all effect;
that this treaty had been, as it were, reaffirmed by the people of the
United States when they adopted the Constitution in 1789, and had
been declared in the clause relating to all treaties to be the supreme
4. Webster's Works, vol. i, p. 2o9.
5. 3 Dallas Reports, 199. It deserves note that John Marshall was of
counsel in this case, p. 210.
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law of the land, and that consequently the courts were bound to
enforce it, even though it was retroactive in its character.
Since the decision in Ware v. Hylton, controversies have arisen
in reference to the title to land in different States composing the
American Union. In 1812, in Fairfax v. Hunter, the Supreme
Court held that title to land in Virginia was vested in a British sub-
ject by the treaty of 1783, and that it superseded the laws of Vir-
ginia on this subject so far as they were inconsistent with it. Again,
in 1817, in Chirac v. Chirac,7 a similar ruling was made in regard to
the title of a French subject to land in the State of Maryland. It is
true that the courts of this country in considering the effect, not
only of treaties but of the provisions of the Constitution itself, have
uniformly declared that, in order to justify the court in declaring
a particular statute invalid, the contradiction between it and the
Constitution or the treaty must be clear.
In the very recent case of Johnson v. Browne, decided April 8th,
19o7,8 the judgment of the court on that subject is thus expressed
(p. 321) :-
A later treaty will not be regraded as repealing an earlier statute by
implication, unless the two are absolutely incompatible and the statute can-
not be enforced without antagonizing the treaty.
Another interesting instance of the application of the rule estab-
lished by the Supreme Court upon this subject is to be found in
what are known as the Passenger Tax Cases.9 In these cases stat-
utes had been adopted by the States of New York and Massachusetts
imposing a tax upon passengers coming into the ports in those
States. The proceeds of the tax thus imposed were used to defray
the expense of immigration stations which then were maintained by
the States themselves. These acts were alleged to be invalid on
several grounds, among these on the ground that they were in con-
flict with the treaty between the United States and Great Britain.
This "contention was sustained by the Supreme Court.10  It held:-
3. That the Acts of Massachusetts and New York in question in these
cases conflict with treaty stipulations existing between the United States and
Great Britain, permitting the inhabitants of the two countries "freely and
securely to come, with their ships and cargoes, to all places, ports, and rivers
in the territories of each country to which other foreigners are permitted
to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of said
6. 7 Cranch Rep., 6D3.
7. 2 Wheaton Rep., 259.
8. 2o5 U. S., 309.
9. 7 Howard, U. S. Reports, 288.
10. 7 Howard, U. S. Reports, 412.
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territories respectively; also, to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for
the purposes of their commerce, and generally the merchants and traders
of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and
security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of
the two countries respectively:" and that said laws are therefore unconstitu-
tional and void.
At a later period, when by the Treaty of Paris, Porto Rico was
ceded by Spain to the United States, the question arose as to whether
that island became, by virtue of the treaty, without any legislation
by Congress, territory of the United States, and therefore not for-
eign. If so, the tariff laws of the United States would cease to
apply, and goods coming from Porto Rico to the United States
would be entitled to admission free of duty, until Congress should
otherwise enact. The Supreme Court so held."'
It will thus be seen that in numerous instances in which personal
rights, the title to real estate, the payment of debts, and the imposi-
tion of tariff duties are concerned, the provisions of the Constitution
on this subject have been enforced by the Federal Courts and the
treaty has been carried into effect by them, without further legisla-
tion.
Whether the courts will do this or not depends first upon whether
the treaty itself provides that further legislation must be had before
it shall take effect. Such was the treaty of 1883 with Mexico.
1 2
Several treaties with Great Britain have been drawn so that certain
portions of them should not take effect until reciprocal legislation
should be had, both in the United States and in the Dominion of
Canada. In this connection it should be noted that the Legislature
of Great Britain takes no part in the ratification of a treaty. Under
the Constitution of that country a treaty is negotiated by the Sov-
ereign alone. But this means, of course, so far as Great Britain
is concerned, that it is negotiated by his Ministers, who are respon-
sible to Parliament, and who are generally in a position to carry
successfully through Parliament any legislation which may be neces-
sary to enforce the stipulations of the treaty. Experience has
shown, however, that it does not at all follow that the Legislatures
of the different self-governing colonies forming part of the British
Empire will approve treaties negotiated by the Home Government,
or adopt the laws necessary to carry them into effect.
In the next place it must be remembered that some provisions in
treaties can never become the subject of adjudication by the courts.
ii. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. i.
12. U. S. Treaties and Conventions, ed. IS88, p. 714.
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The enforcement of these provisions, from the necessity of the case,
depends upon the good faith of the Government.
The rule on this subject is well stated by the Supreme Court of
the United States in ex parte Cooper, 143 U. S. Reports, 472. This
was a case involving the jurisdiction of the United States over the
waters of Behring Sea. At page 5oi the Supreme Court refers
with approval to a previous decision in United States v. Rauscher
(1i 9 U. S. 407, 418), as follows-
Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, quoted from the
Head-Money cases, 112 U. S. 58o, the following language as determinative of
the principle upon which the court proceeded: "A treaty is primarily a com-
pact between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its
provisions on the interest and the honor of the Governments which are
parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international
negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek
redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that
with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.
But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon
the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits
of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are
capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the
country. An illustration of this character is found in treaties which regulate
the mutual rights of citizens and subjects of the contracting nations in regard
to rights of property by descent or inheritance, when the individuals
concerned are aliens. The Constitution of the United States places such
provisions as these in the same category as other laws of Congress, by its
declaration that 'this Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof,
and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land.' A treaty, then, is a law of the
land, as an Act of Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule
by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.
And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice,
that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it
as it would to a statute."
The question then naturally arises: Are there no limits to the
treaty-making power of the President and Senate of the United
States? The fundamental rule for the construction of grants of
power in the United States Constitution was established by the
Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden. There the court had occasion
to pass upon the question whether different States of the Union
had power to impose taxes or restrictions upon commerce entering
their ports from other States of the Union. In this particular
instance the State of New York, in order to reward Robert Fulton
and Robert R. Livingston for inventions which had made navigation
by steam practicable, gave to them and their heirs a monopoly of
trade by steam vessels within the waters of the State of New York.
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The Supreme Court held that this grant was in violation of the
Constitution of the United States and of the clause in that instru-
ment which confers upon Congress "power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several States." In disposing
of this controversy the Supreme Court used the following lan-
guage:' 3-
The subject is transferred to Congress, and no exception to the grant
can be admitted which is not proved by the words or the nature of the thing.
In the Constitution itself there is no restriction in words upon
the treaty-making power. No doubt some restriction is to be
implied from the nature of the case. A treaty with a foreign Gov-
ernment must of necessity relate to some matter which is a proper
subject of international regulation. It could not, for example, be
contended that it would be competent for the United States to make
a treaty with France or Germany by which, in contravention of the
laws of the several States of the Union, it should be provided that
the suffrage should be conferred upon citizens of the foreign country
immediately upon their entering the United States. To use again
the language of the Supreme Court in the case of De Geofroy v.
Riggs.'" -
The treaty-power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited
except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the
action of the Government or of its departments and those arising from the
nature of the Government itself and of that of the States. It would not be
contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,
or a change in the characer of the Government or in that of one of the
States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter without its
consent. But with these exceptions it is not perceived that there is any
limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is
properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country.
It will be evident from what has been said that the courts of the
United States on this subject have spoken with no uncertain sound.
Nor can there be any question under the Constitution of the United
States that it is both the power and the duty of the President to
enforce the provisions- of treaties which have been lawfully ratified
by the Senate. Article 2, Section 3 of this instrument provides:
"He (the President) shall take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted." The power is co-extensive with the grant.
There is one limitation, however, to which attention must be
drawn. At an early period of our judicial history it was held that
in criminal jurisprudence there was no common law of the United
13. 9 Wheaton, 215.
14. 133 U. S., 258.
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States which could be enforced by indictment in the Federal
Courts. 5 In the States, however, it was held that the principles
of the English common law had been adopted by them not only in
matters of civil but of criminal jurisprudence.
It would have been in the public interest if the Federal Courts
had held that, in the absence of special legislation prescribing a dif-
ferent penalty, the violation of an Act of Congress or of a treaty
made by the President and ratified by the Senate should constitute
a misdemeanor indictable in the Federal Courts and punishable by
fine and imprisonment. Such a rule would have enabled the courts
of the Union to give effect to the provisions of treaties by indict-
ment as well as by civil suit. Congress, however, has power to
enact legislation which shall enable the Federal Courts to punish
by indictment a violation of the rights of aliens conferred by treaty.
This was expressly held by the Supreme Court in Baldwin v.
Franks:lq--
That the United States have power under the Constitution to provide
for the punishment of those who are guilty of depriving Chinese subjects
of any of the rights, privileges, immunities, or exemptions guaranteed to
them by this treaty we do not doubt.
The remaining question to which I desire to draw your atten-
tion relates to the duty of Congress in reference to the enforcement
of the provisions of a treaty. For example, when a treaty provides
for the payment of money by the United States in satisfaction of the
claims of foreign subjects, what is the position of Congress in the
matter? The controversy on this subject first arose in reference
to the provisions of the treaty negotiated by John Jay, the first Chief
Justice of the United States, during President Washington's admin-
istration. This treaty provided for the payment by the United
States to British subjects of an indemnity for certain wrongs which
had been inflicted upon them. The treaty was ratified by the Sen-
ate. A bill was introduced in the House of Representatives to pro-
vide for the payment. It is obvious that in all free Governments it
is an essential condition that money shall be appropriated from the
treasury and paid out by the fiscal officers, only in obedience to an
act of the Legislature. On this ground it was contended that the
House of Representatives was not bound to give effect to the pro-
visions of the treaty. Party feeling ran high. War was then rag-
ing between France-the old friend of the American Republic-and
Great Britain. Many Americans sympathized with France. The
15. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch Reports, 32 (1812).
6, 12a U. S. 679.
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feeling of gratitude for the aid rendered by France in the war of the
Revolution was strong. It is not surprising that many Americans
should have felt it wrong to do anything which might be construed
as giving aid and comfort to Great Britain under such circum-
stances. The historic argument on this subject was made by a
member of Congress from Massachusetts, Fisher Ames. He was
one of the leading men of his time. His works have been collected
in two volumes. Everything else that he wrote will probably be
forgotten, except by the antiquarian, but his appeal on this subject
is a masterpiece, and has the almost unique distinction of having
excited such emotion in members of Congress who heard it that
one of the Opposition rose at its conclusion and moved that the
vote might be postponed, in order that members might not cast their
votes too much under the influence of the speech. It was success-
ful, however, and its arguments are just as convincing to-day as
they were in 1796. After showing that under the Constitution the
House of Representatives had no part in the making of the treaty
or in its ratification, he goes on to say :7_
A treaty is a bargain between nations binding in good faith. And what
makes a bargain? The assent of the contracting parties. We allow that the
treaty-power is not in this House. This House has no share in contracting,
and is not a party. In consequence the President and Senate alone may make
a treaty that is binding in good faith.
If we choose to observe it with good faith our course is obvious. What-
ever is stipulated to be done by the nation must be complied with. Our
agency, if it should be requested, cannot be properly refused, and I do not
see why it is not as obligatory a rule of conduct for the Legislature as for
the courts of law.
And then he warns the House, and the warning is just as much
needed to-day as it was a century ago:-
Objections that proceed upon error in fact or calculation may be traced
and exposed. But such as are drawn from the imagination, or traced to it,
return to domineer over the mind after having been banished from it by
truth.
And he adds:
If both parties be not obliged, neither is obliged. It is no compact, no
treaty. This is the dictate of law and common sense, and every jury in the
country has sanctioned it on oath. It cannot be a treaty yet no treaty, a bar-
gain and yet no promise. If it is a promise, I am not to read a lecture to
show why an honest man will keep his promise. . . . No less impossible
that we should desire to assert the scandalous privilege of being free after
we have pledged our honor.
i7. Fisher Ames Works, vol. 2, pp. 43, 44, 47.
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I regret to say that the United States have not always been
loyal to the principles thus stated. There are instances in American
history in which Congress has failed to pass laws necessary to
enforce or protect rights conferred by treaties which have been law-
fully made and have therefore become the supreme law of the land.
Such failure is a just cause of complaint by the foreign Power, and
every true American should see to it, so far as in him lies, that no
such failure occur in the future.
One other proposition in this connection remains to be consid-
ered. The Constitution of the United States, as has been shown,
declares that the treaty is the supreme law of the land. In one of
the ablest arguments that was ever made by that great advocate
who now is chairman of the delegation from the United States to
the second Hague Conference, Mr. Choate, he contended that this
clause meant that the treaty once made could only be changed by
the same power that made it, that is to say, by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate. This contention did not pre-
vail. In the Chinese Exclusion Cases, 8 the Supreme Court of the
United States felt itself obliged to hold that however just might be
the grievance to a foreign nation, even amounting, as was conceded,
to a casus belli, yet the treaty had no greater force than an Act of
Congress, and, consequently, that an Act of Congress could change
it. This, after all, is holding that it is within the power of a nation
to violate its solemn obligations. Such power exists, and must be
reckoned with. But the obligation of honor and duty remains. To
inculcate this obligation is a part of that campaign of education
which William L. Wilson declared was, in a country of universal
suffrage, a continuing duty.
Everett P. Wheeler.
MS. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698.
